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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION -
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE "ESTABLISHMENT" -Claimants brought suit for un-
employment compensation allegedly due them for a period of temporary 
unemployment. Their employer manufactured spark plugs which were 
assembled at its Ohio plant using component parts made at its Michigan 
plant some 50 or 60 miles distant. The parts were transported daily by 
truck to the Ohio plant, and the Michigan plant was under the direct 
supervision of the Ohio plant. When a labor dispute occurred at the 
Michigan plant, lack of parts forced the lay-off of claimants at the Ohio 
plant. Upon termination of the labor dispute and a resumption of pro-
duction the claimants resumed their employment. Claims for unemploy-
ment benefits under the Ohio statute,1 which denies benefits when the 
unemployment is due to a labor dispute at the "establishment," were denied 
by the Administrator and Board of Review of Unemployment Com-
pensation. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed and on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting.2 The 
Michigan and Ohio plants constitute one "establishment" within the mean-
ing of the Ohio act. The two plants are functionally integrated, physically 
proximate, and there is general unity in their operation. Adamski v. State 
of Ohio, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, (Ohio App. 1959) 161 
N.E. (2d) 907. 
The social policy and purpose! of unemployment compensation legisla-
tion is to compensate involuntary unemployment, which can probably be 
best characterized as unemployment forced upon the employee through no 
fault of his own, and to encourage employers to stabilize employment. 
This social policy of compensating only involuntary unemployment under-
lies the labor dispute disqualification provision found in all the state 
statutes. The provision in general denies relief where the unemployment 
is due to a "labor dispute" at the "establishment" in which the claimant 
was employed. Applying the involuntary unemployment concept to the 
principal case, it would appear that the Ohio claimants have been forced 
out of work through no fault of their own, i.e., the cause of their unemploy-
ment cannot be attributed to them, and compensation should be awarded. 
But there is an obvious danger in adopting this view. The employer's 
1 Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1953) §4141.29 (C) (2) provides that no benefits shall be paid 
to any individual who has "lost his employment or left his employment by reason of a 
labor dispute other than a lockout at the factory, establishment, or other premises at 
which he was employed, as long as such labor dispute continues ..•. " The various state 
statutes are compiled in IO Omo ST. L.J. 238 (1949). See, generally, Haggart, "Unemploy-
ment Compensation during Labor Disputes," 37 NEB. L. R.Ev. 668 (1958); Lesser, "Labor 
Disputes and Unemployment Compensation," 55 YALE L.J. 167 (1945). 
2 The dissenting judge felt that the Ohio and Michigan employees worked for dif-
ferent "employers" within the meaning of the statute. 
3 Statements to the effect that the public policy of the act is to provide "benefits to 
persons who are unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary 
unemployment and suffering caused thereby to a minimum" are found in most of the 
state acts. 
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entire labor force, wanting to exert economic coercion against him by 
closing down his entire operations, may do so by striking at only the key 
plants. In such a case the only members of the labor force who lose un-
employment benefits would be workers at the struck plants, while the em-
ployees at those plants which are closed as a result of the strike would 
collect compensation even though they are not adverse to their unemploy-
ment and may be said to have sanctioned or approved it.4 
Whether conscious of it or not, a majority of our courts, including the 
Ohio court in the principal case, have disposed of the problem of key plant 
strikes by their construction of "establishment."5 Various tests have been 
employed to determine what constitutes an "establishment," such as the 
comprehensive test6 of functional integration,7 physical proximity,8 and 
- general unity used in the principal case. Other courts have construed 
"establishment" from a "stand point of employment."9 By making the 
granting or withholding of benefits tum on "nice distinctions in the 
definition of the word establishment," these tests fail to reflect properly 
the social policy of compensating involuntary unemployment.10 Rec-
ognizing this, the California court has refused to place such dubious 
weight on the definition of "establishment" and employed a test of volition 
which makes a subjective inquiry into the substantial elements causing un-
employment to determine if it is really involuntary and innocent.11 Where 
4 Some evidence of this was found in Park v. Appeal Bd. of Michigan Employment 
Security Commission, 355 Mich. 103, 94 N.W. (2d) 407 (1959). The lower court found 
that the claimants, laid off because of a strike at a Ford plant in Ohio, were directly 
interested in the labor dispute. 
5 A few states have attempted to define "establishment." See, e.g., m. Rev. Stat. (1959) 
c. 48, §434. " ••. Provided, that if in any case separate branches of work which are com-
monly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate 
departments of the same premises, each department shall, for the purpose of this Section 
be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment or other premises." 
6 See Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W. {2d) 576 (1950); Snook v. 
International Harvester Co., (Ky. 1955) 276 S.W. (2d) 658; Mountain States Tel. and Tel. 
Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P. (2d) 707 (1950). See 28 A.L.R. (2d) 291 (1953). 
7 See Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941), modified if not 
overruled in Park v. Appeal Bd. of Michigan Employment Security Commission, note 4 
supra. 
s See Spielmann v. Industrial Commission, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. I (1940); Snook v. 
International Harvester Co., note 6 supra; General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 
ll8, 55 A. (2d) 732 (1947). 
11 Machienski v. Ford Motor Co., 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 208 (1951); Snook v. 
International Harvester Co., note 6 supra. 
10 See Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal. (2d) 
695 at 707, 151 P. (2d) 202 (1944), where the court observed "that the legislature did not 
intend that the payment or withholding of benefits should tum on nice distinctions in the 
definition of words like ••• establishment is evident from" the policy declaration of the 
statute. 
11 McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal. (2d) 239, 
209 P. (2d) 602 (1949). The case involved a wage contract negotiation between a union 
representing the employees of several employers and the employers association. When 
the union called a strike against some of the employers, the employers not struck locked-
out their employees. Held, three judges dissenting, the locked out employees were not 
entitled to benefits because they were involved in the trade dispute. See also DePaoli v. 
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an employee is laid off because of a strike at another plant of the employer, 
and the employee is in sympathy with and directly interested in the strike, 
standing to participate in any economic benefits gained thereby, he should 
be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. But if the 
layoff occurs because of a strike at another plant in which the employee 
laid off is not directly interested his unemployment is truly involuntary 
and compensation should follow. The Ohio statute involved in the prin-
cipal case12 is not incapable of such a construction. If the collective bargain-
ing agent is attempting to obtain economic benefits on behalf of the laid-off 
employee as well as the striking employees, the laid-off employees are in 
fact involved in a labor dispute at the place (or "establishment") at which 
they are employed. A similiar construction can be given to the labor 
dispute disqualification provision found in the statutes of a majority of the 
states,13 which prohibits the payment of benefits when there is a "stoppage 
of work which exists because of a labor dispute" at the "establishment." 
This could be construed to mean a "stoppage of work" at the "establish-
ment" which exists because of any labor dispute in which the employee is 
directly interested.14 This construction of the statute directs attention to 
the proper facts in each case, and the social policy of compensating involun-
tary unemployment would be more nearly accomplished. 
William G. Thursby 
Ernst, (Nev. 1957) 309 P. (2d) 363; Olof Nelson Constr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 
Utah 517, 243 P. (2d) 951 (1952); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commis-
sion, 17 Cal. (2d) 321, 109 P. (2d) 935 (1941). 
12Note l supra. 
13 The statutes of about three-fourths of the states have provisions substantially similar 
to the Michigan Act, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) §17.531, which provides that the individual 
shall be disqualified for benefits" ••• (b) For any week with respect to which his total or 
partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in 
the establishment in which he is or was last employed: Provided, however, that no individ-
ual shall be disqualified under this section if he shall establish that he is not directly 
involved in such dispute. For the purpose of this section no individual shall be deemed 
to be directly involved in a labor dispute unless it is established. • • . (2) That he is par-
ticipating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the 
stoppage of work .••• " 
14 See subsection (2) of the Michigan statute, note 13 supra. 
